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[Excerpt] This paper is written for educationists and development planners. Its purposes are to familiarize 
policy makers, advisors, and analysts with the most important approaches to the economics of education 
and to evaluate the various approaches critically in the context of developing countries. Three topics are 
developed: 
1. How social returns to education typically are calculated. 
2. An evaluation of the conventional social return to education approach. 
3. A comparison of central planning and local planning. 
Before embarking on these topics, an important preliminary issue arises: Why conduct economic analysis 
of education at all? After all, might it not be crass to think of education in economic terms? Does not 
investment in education represent an obviously meritorious use of social resources? Is there not 
overwhelming evidence that countries that spend more on education are richer, at least materially? 
Wouldn’t educational expansion be especially beneficial to the poorest citizens of a country those who are 
most likely excluded from education when enrollment ratios are less than universal? How can educators 
and social scientists with Ph.D.'s even think it possible to have too much education? 
The answers to all these questions are the same. Yes, education is a good, but it comes at a cost. To 
spend more on education is to forego expenditures on health care, housing, construction of infrastructure, 
or whatever else the resources might have been used for had they not been devoted to education. The 
concern is not whether more education would produce benefits more on education is the best use of 
resources, taking account of what must be given up to provide education. In deciding on the desirability of 
education and in planning educational systems, the benefits of education need to be assessed in relation 
to the costs. Never is economic analysis more important that when resources are scarcest, as in poor 
countries. 
Recognizing, then, that an economic approach to educational planning is to be desired and not avoided, 
the appropriate question is how is it to be done? The answers are developed in the remainder of this 
report. Section I outlines the logic behind economic analysis of educational planning. Section II describes 
three approaches that have been taken in the literature: the manpower requirements approach, the social 
demand approach, and the social cost-benefit approach. Section III evaluates the social cost-benefit 
approach from a central planning perspective. The central planning perspective is contrasted with local 
planning perspectives in Section IV. Conclusions appear in Section V. 
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SOCIAL RETURNS TO EDUCATION: CENTRAL PLANNING AND 
LOCAL PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 
This paper is written for educationists and development planners. Its 
purposes are to familiarize policy makers, advisors, and analysts with the 
most important approaches to the economics of education and to evaluate the 
various approaches critically in the context of developing countries. Three 
topics are developed: 
1. How social returns to educ*• •-v. typically are calculated. 
2. An evaluation of the conventional social return to education approach. 
3. A comparison of central planning and local planning. 
3efore embarking on these topics, an important preliminary issue arises: 
Why conduct economic analysis of education at all? After all, might it not 
be crass to think of education in economic terms? Does not investment in 
education represent an obviously meritorious use cf social resources? Is 
there not overwhelming evidence that countries that spend more on education 
are richer, at least materially? Wcmldu.'t educational expansion be especially 
beneficial to the poorest citizens o£ a country those who are most likely 
excluded from education when enrollment ratios are less than universal? How 
can educators and social scientists with Ph.D.'s even think it possible to 
have too much education? 
The answers to all these questions are the same. Yes, education is 
a good, but it comes at a cost. To spend more on euucation is to forego 
expenditures on health care, housing, construction of infrastructure, or what-
ever else the resources might have been used for had they not been devoted 
to education. The concern is not whether more education would produce benefits, 
more on education is the best use of resources, taking account of what must 
be given up to provide education. In deciding on the desirability of education 
and in planning educational systems, the benefits of education need to be 
assessed in relation to the costs. Never is economic analysis more important 
thar when resources are scarcest, as in poor countries. 
Recognizing, then, that an economic approach to educational planning is to 
be desired and not avoided, the appropriate question is how is it to be done? 
The answers are developed in the remainder of this report. Section I outlines 
the logic behind economic analysis of educational planning. Section II describes 
three approaches that have been taken in the literature: the manpower requirements 
approach, the social demand approach, and thf? social cost-benefit approach. 
Section III evaluates the social cost-benefit approach from a central planning 
perspective. The central planning perspective is contrasted with local planning 
perspectives in Section IV. Conclusions appear in Section V. 
I. THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF EDUCATIONAL PLANNING 
A. The Idea of Social Costs and Social Benefits 
The economics of education compares the maiginal social costs of education 
to the marginal social benefits. The term "social" is meant to indicate that 
the costs and benefits faced by all members of society, both students and 
others, should be included. Among the social costs are such items as buildings, 
teachers' salaries, pupils' fees, and the earnings foregone by students while 
in school. (Caution: Avoid double-counting.) The social benefits include 
many factors: better jobs gained by the recipients of education; positive 
or negative effects of their employment on job opportunities for the less 
educated; higher on-the-job productivity; better ability to deal with dis-
equilbria; enhanced social mobility; improved health, sanitation, nutrition 
and child-rearing practices; diminished birth rates; a more informed citizenry; 
greater community awareness and pride because of the presence of a school; 
and spillovers into other areas of effective local development efforts. The 
adjective "marginal" in "marginal social benefits" signifies that any educational 
project or program should be evaluated in terms of the extra benefits that 
would be expected to result relative to the extra costs. 
Typically, educational systems are set up so that costs precede benefits. 
During the school years, society expends resources on education. The pay-off 
comes later, when the student is on the job and in the world. This time pattern 
is diagrammed in Figure 1. 
For fuller discussions of the many social benefits that result from 
education, see C. Arnold Anderson and Mary Jean Bowman, Education and Economic 
Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), Lascelles Anderson and Douglas M. Windham, 
Education and Development (Lexington, Mass.: Heath Lexington Books, 1982), 
and World 3ank, Education Sector Policy Paper (Washington, April, 1980). 
The importance of this time pattern is that it enables us to draw upon a 
theorem in capital theory. The theorem states that when costs precede benefits, 
the two methods for evaluating investment programs present value and internal 
rate of return yield equivalent decision rules. Let us now briefly review 
these two methods. 
B. The Present Value Method 
The present value method, as its name implies, determines the present 
value of future streams of costs and benefits. The descriptor "present" is 
meant to emphasize that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the 
future. Or put differently, a dollar accruing in the future must be discounted 
compared to a dollar offered at present. Denote the rate of discounting by 
r. Ordinarily, we would expect that the appropriate discount rate would be 
the market rate of interest, i. For example, suppose i equals 10%. Then 
if I am offered the choice between receiving $100 today or $110 a year from 
now, I would consider these two income opportunities equally attractive. 
Thus: 
,_. „ , j. . ,. Value of income next vear 
(1) Value of income this year = =—•—— 1 r~* 
J
 1 + discount rate 
The present value of any project is the difference between the present value 
of benefits and the present value of costs: 
(2) PV . = PV, ..„ - PV ^ 
project oenefits costs 
The present value of costs is the sum of the costs in each time period, C , 
appropriately discounted: 
Cl C2 CT (3) PV ^ = C + ,-± + —£-=• + . . . + _ v
 ' costs o 1+r ,..
 L N2 .. , NT (1+r) (1+r) 
Likewise, the present value of benefits is: Bl B2 BT (4) PVU £J - Brt + T-— + =- + . . . + — = — -benefits 0 1+r
 (1+r)2 T 
The market rate of interest is the correct criterion when capital markets 
>«-~ ».«.».f«-»- 11,/.- t.Un. 
FIGURE 1. 
TIMING OF COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EDUCATION 
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The present value decision rule is: 
Rule 1. Invest in a project if its present value is positive; do not 
invest otherwise. 
Note that this decision rule is general enough so that any and all presumed 
social benefits and social costs of education can be factored into the equation. 
C. The Social-Rate-of-Return Method 
The other method for social cost-benefit analysis is to calculate a 
social rate of return. This too relies on the notion of time discounting. 
However, it is done differently. Instead of using a specified interest rate 
rate r, the rate of return method finds that discount rate for which the present 
value of costs equals the present value of benefits. This is known as the 
"internal rate of return," or "rate of return" for short. So in the preceding 
example, if I could invest $100 today and receive $110 a year from now, I 
could calculate (using equation (1)) that the rate of return on my investment 
is 10%. In this example, in which we have only a one year lag between the 
time of investment and the payoff date, the rate of return is given implicitly 
by equation (1) and explicitly by: 
,_. _ . Income Next Year ., 
(5) Rate of r e t u r n on mvestement = i n c o t R e This Year " 1* 
To evaluate education projects, which involve many periods, the idea 
is the same, but the arithmetic is a bit more difficult. Use the same principle, 
i.e., equate the present value of costs to the present value of benefits; 
by equations (3) and (4), this is 
C C C B B 2 
(6) Cn + ,, + V T + • • • + 5TT = B n + * + *~2 + • • • + 
0
 1 + r* < l+r*) 2 ( 1 + r V ° 1+r* (1+r*) 2 (1 
* 
The internal rate of return is that particular value of r, denoted here by r , 
which makes the left hand side of (6) equal the right hand side. Having found 
Rule 2. If the internal rate of return r is greater than the market 
rate of interest i, then the project under evaluation is worthwhile; 
otherwise not. 
D. Equivalence of the Two Methods 
Now let us recollect from above the theorem stating that Rule 1 (the present 
value decision rule) and Rule 2 (the internal rate of return decision rule) are 
equivalent under the conditions that apply to most education investments. That 
is, we can talk about present value analysis as being equivalent to rate of 
return analysis. In view of this equivalence, throughout the balance of this 
paper, I will use the terms "social returns to education" and "social cost-
benfit analysis" interchangeably. 
II. THREE APPROACHES TO EDUCATIONAL PLANNING 
Any comprehensive approach to educational planning should take account 
of the welfare gains and losses resulting from the provision of education. 
The first step in doing this is to specify what factors enter into one's 
judgments about social welfare and how education might affect those factors, 
Education has at least four such effects: 
1. Education affects GNP, which affects social welfare; 
2. Education affects inequality, which affects social welfare; 
3. Education affects poverty, which affects social welfare; 
4. Education itself affects social welfare, 
This is summed up in the following flow chart: 
Social 
Welfare 
Appendix I presents a formal model of these effects. The key result is 
that the information requirements are many and include such data as the types 
of jobs available to graduates, the impact of their employment on job oppor-
tunities for persons with less education, etc. But if perfect competition 
in labor markets is taken as a working assumption, many of these information 
requirements are unnecessary, because the answers are assumed in the competitive 
framework. This may explain why the competitive framework is so popular in 
educational planning models: the data requirements are much less severe. 
The balance of this section reviews three approaches to educational 
planning in the light of the social welfare approach developed in the appendix. 
A. The Manpower Requirements Approach 
Insofar as educational planning is done with an eye on costs and benefits, 
a frequent starting point is an analysis of manpower requirements. The "needs" 
of the economy for educated personnel are estimated, either by projecting 
employment patterns in various occupations or industries into the future, by 
asking employers how many persons of a given type they need, by consulting 
employment services and advertisements, or some combination of these. The 
outcome is a set of "requirements": e.g., 500 engineers, 100 doctors, 0 
economists, etc. The educational system in total and its specific faculties 
are then enlarged or contracted according to the dictates of the manpower 
forecast. 
This way of planning education has been severely criticized. One complaint 
is that the method is excessively rigid; it does not allow for substitutability 
among educational or occupational groups. For example, school might be taught 
by untrained teachers, by teachers with secondary-level teacher training, or 
by graduates of university colleges of education, but substitution of one 
category for another is not permitted in such manpower forecasts. Another 
criticism of the manpower requirements approach is that past forecasts have 
proven to be notoriously inaccurate. There is no reason to believe that 
future projections would be any better. 
These and other criticisms are relatively minor as compared with a funda-
mental conceptual flaw: the manpower requirements approach takes no account 
of costs. When employers state their manpower "requirements," they typically 
do so without regard to the costs of educating the engineers, lawyers, 
economists, or teachers they are hiring. Would employers still want to hire 
the same number if they had to pay the costs of their education? The likely 
answer is no. In economic analyses of education, all the benefits and costs 
of educated manpower must be considered. Since the manpower requirements 
criterion neglects costs entirely and looks only at private benefits, it is 
basically flawed as a method for educational planning, 
In sum, the manpower requirements approach starts with a good question: 
what jobs will there be for the graduates of the educational system? However, 
the manpower requirements approach does not ask enough questions. What it 
leaves out is: to get these benefits, what costs have to be paid? For 
rational educational planning, the manpower requirements approach is a useful 
starting point, but we must go further, 
B. The Social-Demand-for-Education Approach 
The social-demand-for-education approach is popular among educationists, 
less so among economists. What this approach does is to quantify the "social 
demand for education," by which is meant the number of people want to 
attend school (or parents who want to send their children to school). If 
the number desiring education is greater than the number of spaces, adherents 
of thiu approach would argue tha "ore education should be provided. After 
all, so this line of reasoning goes, who would know more about the value of 
education than the people themselves? 
This approach also is conceptually flawed. When people decide whether 
to send their children tc school, they do so on the basis of the private costs 
of education in relation to the private benefits. The private costs are what 
the individual or family must pay for education. The private benefits are what 
the individual or family receives. The private costs and benefits may diverge 
systematically from the social costs and benefits. On the cost 
side, educational systems in developing countries are typically heavily sub-
sidized. The school fees charged to students and their parents cover only a 
fraction of the total resource cost. Because the difference must be paid by 
taxpayers in the society, the social cost of education may be presumed to 
exceed the private cost. 
On the benefit side of the equation, only by happenstance would the 
social benefits of education exactly equal the private benefits. There are 
two possibilities^ 
(i) It may be that the individual who is educated benefits more 
from education than does society. This is likely to arise when 
wages do not fulfill a market-clearing function; more will be 
said about this later in this report. What is important for us 
now is that in this case the private benefits to education are 
apt to exceed the social benefits. Alternatively: 
(ii) It may be that society benefits more from education than does the 
individual who is educated. Society may receive a whole host 
of benefits, some of which are alluded to on the top of page 3. 
Some of these benefits accrue to persons other than the individual 
who is educated. Economists call these benefits that accrue to 
others "externalities." When external benefits are large relative 
to private benefits, the possibility arises that the private 
benefits of education will be less than the social benefits. 
in case (i), we have: 
(7) (A) The private cost of education is less than (<) the social 
cost of education. 
(B) The private benefit of education is greater than (>) the 
social benefit of education. 
(C) The private cost-benefit ratio is greater than the social 
cost-benefit ratio. 
Condition (7.C) implies that the private rate of return to education will be 
larger than the social rate. 
Consider now what would happen if resources were to be allocated to 
education on the basis of the "social demand," i.e., on the basis of the 
private return. If both the private and the social rates of return surpass 
the market rate of interest i.e., if 
(8) Private rate > Social rate > Market rate 
of return of return of interest, 
we will reach the socially correct decision namely, to expand the educational 
system but we will have done so usinf the wrong decision rule. This is 
because we would have based the decision on the private rate of return when 
the logic of social cost-benefit analysis leads us to view the social rate 
of return as the appropriate decision criterion. i 
Suppose, however, that the market rate of interest were in between the 
private and social rates of return: 
(9) Private rate > Market rate > Social rate 
of return of interest of return 
The appendix gives an example of this. In such a case, by using th^ private 
rate of return criterion, the socially incorrect decision would be reached. 
Too much education would be supplied, and it would be appropriate not to 
Alternatively, consider case (ii), in which society benefits more from 
education than does the individual who is educated. In this case, we have: 
(10) (A) The private cost of education is less than the social 
cost of education. 
(B) The private benefit of education is less than the social 
benefit of education, 
(C) The private coat-benefit ratio may be greater than, less 
than, or equal to the social cost-benefit ratio. 
It follows from condition (10.C) that the private rate of return to education 
may be greater than, less than, or equal to the social rate of return. As 
in case (i), allocating resources to education on the basis of the "social 
demand" would entail the wrong decision rule; but unlike case (i) , thr* way 
in which the decision deviates from the social optimum (i.e., whether we end 
up with too much education being provided, or too little) cannot be determined 
a priori. Once again, the "social demand" for education is a fallacious 
guide to public policy. 
Actually, the very term "social demand" is a misnomer. It does not 
reflect the desires to taxpayers and other members of society who have to 
pay the costs of education or who may receive external benefits. It reflects 
only the perceptions by potential pupils and their parents of the private 
costs and private benefits of education. Consequently, economists typically 
refer to the number wanting education not as the "social demand" but rather 
as the "private demand for education," thereby emphasizing that the basis 
for this demand is a comparison of the private costs with the private benefits. 
In sum, the social-demand-far-education approach improves upon the man-
power forecasting approach by including the costs of education as well as the 
benefits. However» the social-demand-for-education approach remains de-
ficient, because those costs and benefits that are included are private 
costs. whc-"aas social decisions should be made on the basis of social costs 
and benefits. It is this which social rate of return analysis attempts to do. 
C. The Social Rata of Return Approach 
The social-rate-of-return approach endeavors to compare the social 
benefits of education with the social costs. Sometimes, social rates of return 
are calculated; other times, present values, Here is a brief outline of how 
it's done in practice. (The following two paragraphs are adapted from an 
. 1 
article by one of the leading figures in the field, Dr. George Psacharopouios,) 
Estimates of the rate, of return to a given level of education are cal-
culated by comparing the discounted benefits over the lifetime of an educational 
investment "project" to the costs of such project. Thus, for the calculation 
of the social rate of return to four years of unviersity education, benefits 
are estimated by taking the difference bewteen existing statistics on the mean 
pre-tax earnings of university giaduates by age and those of a samp} group 
of secondary school graduates. The earnings of the latter also represents the 
opportunity cost of staying in school. Direct costs should include the full 
amount of resources committed per student of higher education, rather than the 
usually smaller part of expenditure borne by the student. Given these data, 
the rate of return to investment in a college degree compared with a secondary 
school qualification is the rate of interest that reduces to zero the net 
present value of the discounted difference between the costs and benefits. 
A simple equation for the social rate of return is: 
/Mean annual pre- \ /Mean ja  \ _  annual pre-tax 
tax earnings of 1 i earnings of secondary 
(11) Social rate _ Vuniversity graduates/ Vschool graduates 
or return /Four yearsT. /Mean annual pre A . /Mean annual social"* 
study } ( tax earnings of \ / direct cost of 
secondary school ) [ study 
V graduates 
Note that this formula can be Interpreted as the yield of a permanent constant 
stream of benefits (the. difference in earnings appearing in the numerator) 
over a lump sum cost of projected earnings plus direct outlays (appearing 
in the denominator). Neither the permanent benefits assumption nor the 
lumping together of costs are critical in the calculation, since the latter 
occur within four years and the former extend over several decades. 
A. private rate of return to college education could be calculated in the 
"ame way, although earnings should be post-tax (as the individual does not 
receive the earnings that are taxed) and the direct costs are obtained from 
statistics on a student's out-of-pocket expenditures that are strictly due 
to the costs of college attendance. 
Social-return-to-education analysis seeks to weigh the social benefits 
of additional education against the social costs. In so doing, it asks the 
right questions. This is a major advantage compared to the manpower require-
ments and social demand for education approaches. For this reason, I restrict 
my attention to the social returns to education approach in what follows. 
III.. EVALUATING THE SOCIAL RATE-QF-RETURN APPROACH FROM A CENTRAL 
PLANNING PERSPECTIVE 
As we saw in Section II, social-return-to-education analysis asks the 
right questions, How good a job does this method do of answering them? The 
answer depends on four criteria: 
1. Are all costs included? 
2. Are all costs valued properly? 
3. Are all benefits included? 
4. Are all benefits valued properly? 
In this section and in the accompanying appendix, I evaluate social cost-benefit 
analysis according to these criteria. I conclude that social rates of return 
to education in developing countries as conventionally calculated have two 
serious problems: 
1. Much of what should be included is missing, and 
2. Much of what is included is not valued properly. 
A. Are All the Relevant Costs Included? 
Yes. The relevant costs include such direct outlays as costs of buildings, 
teachers' salaries, and educational materials, plus the indirect cost due 
to foregone output while the children are in school. Nothing important is 
left out in the social rate-of-retum calculations. 
B. Are the Included Costs Valued Properly? 
It depends. In computing social rates of return, the direct outlays 
are valued according to their dollar cost. This is appropriate if it does 
not matter who pays the costs. But if public policy is concerned with alleviating 
poverty and inequality and reaching the poor majority, the incidence of costs 
matters. Tbis is where the progressivity or regressivity of the tax structure 
and the size of the overall budget surplus or deficit enter in. In many LDCs, 
taxpayers as whole, including many poor families, help subsidize the education 
of the few, drawn disproportionately from the upper and middle classes. 
The indirect costs (i.e., foregone output) in social return analysis 
are measured by the average earnings of persons without the educational level 
in question. Implicitly, this assumes that society loses that output, because 
the jobs the students would have filled had they not been in school remain 
vacant. This assumption may or may not be correct; it depends on the charac-
teristics of the economy in question. 
C. Are All the Relevant Benefits Included? 
No. Social-rate-of-return analysis deals explicitly only with the 
extra output that the economy is presumed to gain by educating more people. 
In a poor country, this probably is the most important benefit of education. 
But other benefits, such as those listed at the beginning of Section I, are 
important too. Some of these are indirect (e.g., the effect of education on 
improved child-rearing practices) and others are non-quantifiable (e.g., 
a well-informed populace able to enjoy the arts, literature, and the good 
things of life). The omission of these indirect and non-quantifiable benefits 
from social cost-benefit calculations is not particularly troublesome. It 
can be justified in the following way: We know*these other benefits exist. 
If investing in education is cost-effective when only the output gains are 
considered, then education is all the more worthwhile when these other benefits 
are added in. But suppose the measured social benefits are smaller than the 
social costs, say by $1,000. We then have an explicit standard against which 
to gauge the miscellaneous gains from education: are the unmeasured benefits 
vorth $1,000? Though the economist can pose this question, he cannot answer 
it that must be left to educationists, planners, and the people themselves. 
Less aggregatively, conventional social cost-benefit analysis ignores 
such micro development objectives as reducing poverty and inequality and 
raising employment. When these concerns are relevant, besides looking just at 
the number of beneficiaries, it is of interest as well to examine the bene-
ficiaries in terms of their socio-economic status. It should be shown that 
the beneficiaries will be drawn in large numbers from the target group; fears 
that educational expansion will cater exclusively or primarily to the elites 
should be allayed. 
D. Are the Included Benefits Valued Properly? 
It depends. If the labor market is competitive, yes; if not, no. The 
included benefit is the extra output that would be produced by a better-educated 
labor force. As indicated earlier, this extra output is approximated by 
the difference in annual earnings of persons with the educational level in 
question as compared to persons without. How appropriate is this procedure? 
On the positive side, this methodology is well-warranted in the theory 
of competitive labor markets. In that theory, the last worker hired is paid 
according to what he produces the value of his marginal product. Further-
more, in competitive markers, wages adjust so that the supply and demand for 
different labor categories are in balance. If educated workers are paid more 
than less-educated worekrs competitive theory says it is because the educated 
workers are more productive than the less educated. The extra output due 
to education is the value of marginal product of an educated worker minus the 
value of marginal product of a less-educated worker. Under the competitive 
assumption, the difference in their value of marginal products is identical 
to the difference in their earnings. And it is this difference in earnings 
that is taken as the measure of social benefits from education in social 
cost-benefit analysis. 
The standard methodology has been questioned on several grounds. One is 
that some part of the earnings differential between educated and less-educated 
persons is not due to education. The most important factor is differential 
ability. Secondary schools, colleges, and universities try to admit the most 
able students. These individuals probably would earn more than the average 
even if they didn't have the education. So some part of the earnings dif-
ferential reflects ability, not education per se. In some studies, an adjust-
ment factor (usually called "alpha") is introduced to deal with this problem; 
but alpha is selected arbitrarily rather than on the basis of scientific measure-
ment. 
Another difficulty with the standard methodology is the failure to dis-
tinguish between average and marginal returns to education. The average return 
to education is what is conventionally used. It is the difference in mean 
annual earnings. But economic theory tells us that decisions should be based 
on marginal costs and benefits. The implicit assumption in the conventional 
literature is that that marginal benefit equals the average benefits. This 
is a very strong assumption which may not be correct. To determine the 
marginal beneftis from a proposed educational program, projections are needed 
on what the newly-educated persons will do. What type of work will they find 
when they leave school in the future and how much will they earn from it? How 
much more productive will they be in that work with education than without it? 
Are otherswith less education likely to be displaced, and if so, what will 
they do instead? All these questions require a forward-looking approach. 
This is where educational planners and manpower planners need to work hand-
in-hand . 
But the most important difficulty with the standard methodology as 
applied to developing countries is the heavy reliance on an implicit conception 
of how these countries' labor markets work. Earlier we saw how 
the standard approach is warranted in terms of competitive labor market theory. 
But what if the labor market is not competitive? Suppose,instead,that wages 
are set institutionally above the market-clearing level, and hence the 
quantity of labor supplied exceeds the quantity demanded at the institutionally-
determined wage. Then, as I show in the appendix, the conventional method of 
calculating social benefits overstates the output gains from additional education. 
The basic reason is that in non-competitive labor markets the newly-educated 
workers may not find jobs comparable to what previously-educated workers had 
been able to find. If the newly-educated workers are unemployed, then the 
marginal benefit tc education (at least in output terms) is zero. Alternatively, 
if the newly-educated workers take jobs that previously had been filled by 
less-educated workers, then the relevant question is: how much more productive 
are well-educated workers in those jobs than less-educated workers? There is 
no reason to think that they are several times more productive, which is what 
would be assumed if the productivity gain is approximated by the mean difference 
in earnings- between educational groups. 
E. Overall Evaluation 
Summarizing the preceding discussion, I conclude that conventional social 
cost-benefit analysis pays little attention to who pays the costs of education 
and who receives the benefits. Therefore, the contribution of education 
» 
to lessening poverty, reducing inequality, and raising employment is virtually 
ignored. But oven if we consider social returns to education strictly in 
terms of aggregate output, there still are problems. Whether the included 
costs and benfits are evaluated properly by the conventional methods depends 
on the structure of labor markets in the country in question. If the labor 
market is close to competitive, then the standard methods are appropriate. 
But if the labor market is not competitive, use of the standard methods is 
problematical. The marginal social benefits of education are overstated by 
conventional methods. The marginal social costs may also be. The benefits 
are probably overstated by more than the costs. If so, the social rate of return 
to education which is conventionally calculated (the average return) will be 
too large, and may be of a completely different magnitude from, the true 
(marginal) social rate of return. 
How serious a problem is this? Few developing countries have labor markets 
that could reasonably be characterized as approximately competitive. Thus, in 
the majority of cases, conventional social rates of return may mislead rather 
than inform. See the appendices for further details of these arguments. 
IV. HOW WOULD LOCAL PLANNING DIFFER FROM CENTRAL PLANNING? 
A. The Question Under Investigation 
Central governments in developing countries play a much larger role in 
deciding the sizes of their educational systems and methods of financing than 
•does the federal government in the United States. One important policy issue 
under discussion in the education field is: what would be the effects of 
increased local decision-making? This section presents an analytical frame-
work for answering two questions: (i) whether a shift to planning by a local 
authority such as a village chief or local school board would be likely to 
result in more or less education being provided than under central planning, 
and (ii) whether a shift to local planning would result in a better allocation 
of resources. 
I shall consider three possible decision-making regimes: 
REGIME I. The central government is the decision-maker. 
It makes its decisions on the basis of the true social 
costs of education and the true social benefits. 
REGIME II. The central government is the decision-maker. 
It makes its decisions on the basis of true social costs 
of education, but unlike REGIME I, it measures social 
benefits in conventional ways. 
REGIME III. The locality is the decisionmaking unit. 
The local education authority makes decisions on the basis 
of local costs of education and local benefits.! 
It makes a difference how broadly the locality is defined. In this 
report, I define the locality as being the set of individuals who live within 
specified boundaries at any point in time. By this conception, when individuals 
move away, they cease to be counted as local residents. An alternative defi-
nition——-one not pursued here—is to regard the locality as being comprised 
of those individuals who resided in a particular place at some base date. By 
this broader definition, benefits from education that accrue to outmigrants 
are regarded as benefits to the locality in question, whereas under the narrower 
definition, benefits accrue to the original locality only insofar as the out-
migrants send remittances back from their desintations. I work with the nar-
rower definition of "locality" in what follows. 
The various decision-making regimes are illustrated in Figure 2. Moti-
vations for each appear in subsection B below. 
In each regime, decisions are posited to be made on the basis of the 
decision-makers'perceptions of the costs and benefits. They differ in 
specifying which costs and benefits are to be included. Consequently, they 
differ also in the quantities of education (as represented by enrollment 
ratios) that would result. Below, I- analyze differences in the probable out-
comes emerging from the three decision-making regimes. 
The evaluative questions used for assessing and comparing the three regimes 
are: 
(1) What is optimal? 
(2) How does the amount of education supplied under each regime 
compare with the optimum? 
(3) How do the amounts of education supplied under each regime compare 
with one another? 
To answer these questions, we need to develop an appropriate analytical frame-
work and a criterion for optimality. These are the subjects of subsections B 
and C respectively. 
B. The Analytical Framework 
To compare local planning of education with central planning, we must 
begin by specifying how each unit might behave if it were responsible for 
education decisions. 
Start with the central government. Suppose that when it is the education 
decision-making unit, its decisions are made on the basis of perceived social 
costs and benefits. This is a favorable characterization, not necessarily 
REGIME I: The central 
government is the 
decision-maker. It 
makes its decisions 
on the basis of the 
true social costs of 
education and the 
true social benefits. 
REGIME II: The central 
government is the decision-
maker. It makes its decisions 
on the basis of true social 
costs of education, but it 
measures social benefits 
in conventional ways. 
REGIME III: The locality 
is the decision-making 
unit. The local education 
authority makes decisions 
on the basis of local costs 
of education and local 
benefits. 
correct in all places and circumstances. Still, let us stick to the assumption 
that perceived social costs and benefits are used as the basis for educational 
decisions under central planning. 
How would social costs and benefits be perceived by the central government? 
Either the true social costs and benefits are perceived accurately, or per-
ceptions deviate systematically from actuality. (A third possibility is that 
perceptions differ from reality but in no systematic way; this case is unin-
teresting analytically.) In what follows, we shall work with the first two of 
these characterizations and assume either: 
a) the central authorities know what the true social costs and 
benefits are and act on the basis of them, or 
b) the central authorities act on the basis of social costs and 
benefits obtained from conventional social rate of return cal-
culations. 
As we saw in Section III and Appendix II, whether the conventional 
calculations yield appropriate answers or not depends on conditions in the 
labor market. If the labor market is competitive, then the social costs 
and benefits of education as conventionally calculated correspond to true 
social costs and benefits, at least insofar as narrow economic costs and 
benefits are concerned. But as we also saw, if the labor market is not 
competitive, the conventional methods systematically overstate the outputx 
gains from education, because the additional educated workers will be unemployed 
or underemployed. The standard analysis is appropriate if the underlying 
assumption of a competitive labor market is valid in a particular empirical 
setting. If the assumption is inappropriate, the standard calculations are 
• A/ 
^appropriate too. 
Up to now, we've looked at central decision-making. How would local 
decision-making differ? It is reasonable to posit that the local education 
authority would respond to local costs and local benefits. For example, when 
they consider building a school, they weigh the costs to the community of 
building materials, construction labor, classroom supplies, and teachers' 
salaries. Those costs that are paid by other bodies (say, by an outside donor, 
a central Ministry of Education, or state aid) may, in the first instance, be 
ignored by the local authorities. - Likewise, they may be presumed to concern 
themselves only with benefits that accrue to the locality. There is, of course, 
no reason for local education officials to heed non-local costs and benefits. 
In fact, to the extent that they do, they might be charged with failing to 
represent the interests of their constituents. 
How do local costs compare with total costs? Even when the schools are 
locally-run, -operated, and -financed, some (perhaps sizable) share of the 
cost typically is born by the central government. Thus, local costs 
ordinarily would be less than total social cost for any given quantity of edu-
cation, as shown in Figure 3. (Both marginal cost curves are drawn as up-
ward sloping for the usual reasons.) 
Now, what about benefits? Whether local benefits are greater or less 
than social benefits in the society as a whole depends on the workings of labor 
markets. Once again, the issue is whether or not labor markets are competitive. 
Now, let us consider how the local benefit is apt to compare with the social 
benefit in typical situations. 
If the labor market is competitive, the local benefit will probably be 
less than the true social benefit. This is because some of the benefits 
of education will accrue outside the local area. There are two main reasons 
for this. One is that education i£/ one community may have positive exter-
nalities on an adjacent community. For example, educated farmers in one 
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locality may fertilize or irrigate their crops differently, and this may 
result in demonstration effects for nearby farmers who hadn't been to school 
themselves. The other reason the local benefit of education would probably 
be less than the benefit to society as a whole relates to emigration. Very 
often, educated individuals leava the rural communities and work in the 
cities of their wwn countries or abroad. The local community benefits 
economically from this activity only to the extent that the out-migrants 
remit substantial sums to their home communities. To repeat, when labor 
markets are competitive, the local benefit of education is likely to be 
smaller than the true social benefit. 
Figure 4 shows the probable shape of the true marginal social benefit 
curve and the local marginal benefit curve in the case of a competitive 
labor market. Both are shown as decreasing functions of the enrollment ratios, 
in recognition of diminishing returns to education. The local marginal 
benefit curve is shown as lying everywhere below the true marginal social 
benefit curve; this reflects the fact that some of the benefits accrue outside 
the locality. 
If labor markets are not competitive, the situation will be different. 
In this case, the perceived local benefit is likely to be greater than the 
true social benefit but less than the social benefit as conventionally per-
ceived and calculated* The reason the local benefit is less than the conven-
tional social benefit is the same as in the preceding paragraph: some of the 
benefits of education accrue to persons living outside the local area. On 
the other hand, both the local and r. -1-local benefits are private benefits and, 
as in the example in Appendix II, these private benefits may not have counter-
parts in social benefits. Consequently, though- the true social benefit may be 
Eero or close to it, the local benefit (i.e., the private benefits accruing 
to members of the local community) may well be positive. 
Figure 5 illustrates the benefits of education in the case of a non-
competitive labor market. Now, in contrast to the competitive case, the probable 
position of the true marginal social benefit curve is below the local marginal 
benefit curve. This is because society Denefits from increased education only 
to the extent that educated workers are more productive than uneducated ones, 
whereas local workers benefit a great deal from education if their education 
causes them to be hired preferentially, even if they are only marginally 
more productive. The margianal social benefit as conventionally calculated 
is drawn to lie above the local marginal benefit curve, again because part 
of the apparent benefit is realized outside the locality. 
In sum, the probable relationships are: 
1. The marginal social cost curve is apt to lie everywhere above 
the local cost, curve. 
2. In the case of a competitive labor market, the social benefit as 
conventionally calculated coincides with the true marginal social 
benefit curve, and both are apt to lie above the local benefit curve. 
3. In the case of a non-competitive labor market, the local benefit curve 
is apt to lie above the true marginal social benefit curve but 
below the marginal social benefit curve as conventionally calculated. 
C. What is Optimal? 
At the beginning of t h i s sect ion, we raised three decision-making regimes 
for consideration: 
Regime # Decision-Maker Basis for Decision 
I Central government True social costs, true social benefits 
II Central government True social costs, social benefits 
as conventionally measured 
IH Local authorities Local costs, local benefits 
Which of these three regimes is optimal? Before we can answer this question, 
we need to establish a criterion for optimality. 
It might be argued that optimality is properly defined in terms of the 
decision-making process. Those who favor local decision-making per se more 
or less irrespective of the actual decisions made would prefer Regime III. 
Others would argue that optimality is properly defined in terms of the 
outcome of the decision. Those who seek the highest benefit from education 
net of costs more or less irrespective of the level of decision-making would 
favor Regime I. 
In what follows, I use the outcome criterion for optimality. 
D. Comparing the Three Regimes 
Figures 6 and 7 depict the outcomes of each decision-making regime in 
the cases of competitive labor markets and non-competitive labor markets 
respectively. The results that emerge as being most probable are: 
1. In the case of competitive labor markets: 
A. Central decision-making according to conventional social 
cost-benefit calculations (Regime II) will result in a socially 
optimal allocation of resources. This is because in the compe-
titive case, the conventional social cost and benefit curves 
coincide with the true ones. 
B. Decision-making by a local education authority (Regime III) 
will result in a socially non-optical allocation of resources. 
This is because the true social costs and social benefits are 
not taken account of. 
C. Whether the local decision process entails too much going 
to education or too little is indeterminate. This indeterminacy 
arises because, although the local benefits are less than the social 
benefits, the local costs also are lower, and the effect of these 
deviations on the size of the educational system depends on which 
gap (i.e., the benefit gap or the cost gap) is larger. 
2, In the case of non-competitive labor markets: 
•• - I I I I I N fc I . . . - - — 
A. If the central government allocates resources to education 
on the basis of conventional social cost-benefits calculations 
(Regime II), the resultant educational system will be too large 
relative to the social optimum. This is because in Regime II 
social benefits are overstated relative to their true values. 
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B. I£ resources are allocated to education by a 
local education authority on the basis of local 
costs and local benefits (Regime III), the resultant 
education system will be too large relative to 
the social optimum. This is because the local 
cost is less than the true social cost and the 
local benefits are greater than the true social 
benefits. 
C. Whether the allocation by the central govern-
ment according to conventional social cost-benefit 
calculations (Regime II) results in a larger or 
smaller deviation from optimality than if the 
resources are allocated by a local education 
authority (Regime III) cannot be determined a 
priori. The ambiguity is for the same reason 
as in the competitive case: both the local 
benefits and the local costs are lower than 
the social benefits and costs, so the outcome 
depends on the relative gaps. 
E
* Summary of Results 
Defining an optimal decision-making regime as one in which consideration 
of true social costs and true social benefits leads to an educational system 
of optimal size, the results of this section can be summed up in a single 
sentence: The optimum will never be attained under resource allocation by 
a local education authority and will be attained using conventional social 
cost-benefit methods under central decision-making only when labor markets 
are competitive. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Why conduct economic analysis of education? The most fundamental reason 
is that the resources expended on education could be put to alternative uses. 
The marginal social benefits of education must be estimated and evaluated in 
light of these opportunity costs. 
The costs and benefits of education may be compared by calculating either 
a net present value or a social rate of return. These two methods give the 
same answers in educational projects, and so may be used interchangeably. 
Various approaches are available for educational planning. The "manpower 
requirements approach" is deficient, both because it neglects costs and because 
manpower projections have not proven very accurate. The "social demand approach" 
also is deficient. Despite its name, it examines private costs and benefits; 
but social decisions should be based on social costs and benefits, not private 
ones. The "social cost-benefit approach" endeavors to quantify these social 
costs and social benefits. In so doing, it embodies important aspects of 
both the manpower forecasting and the social demand approaches. 
How useful are the results from conventional social cost-benefit cal-
culations? The answer depends on the circumstances in a particular country 
specifically, on the competitiveness of its labor markets. If the labor 
market is approximately competitive, then conventional social cost-benefit 
calculations are useful; otherwise not. Intuitively, the reason is that 
the conventional methods present average rates of return; the appropriate 
criterion for allocating resources is the marginal rate of return; and the 
average and the marginal can be presumed equal only when labor markets are 
competitive. In the majority of less developed countries labor markets are 
thought to be very far from competitive. Only in relatively unusual instances, 
mttieiore, can conventional social rate of return calculations in developing 
countries be justified. This is not to say that social cost-benefit analysis 
should be dismissed- Rather, it should be done in more sophisticated ways. 
How do local decision-making and central decision-making differ? In 
a competitive labor market, central government consideration of social rates 
of return can reasonably be expected to result in an educational system of 
optimal size. However, in the case of a non-competitive labor market, 
central government decision-making on the basis of a conventional social rate 
of return calculation would produce distortions. Decision-making by a local 
education authority, in contrast, would never be expected to produce the 
optimal outcome. Under labor market competition, the direction in which 
local decision-making deviates from the optimum is indeterminate. When 
labor markets are not competitive in the ways described in this report, 
decision-making by the central government or by a local education authority 
would be expected to result in an educational system that is too large 
relative to the social optimum. In a con-competitive environment, it cannot 
be determined a priori which regime (central planning or local planning) yields 
an outcome closer to the social optimum. 
The available methods for assessing the social returns to education 
have their strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side, they ask important 
questions about what social benefits would be expected from additional education 
and what costs have to be paid. They are quite appropriate under conditions 
of labor market competitiveness. But on the negative side, some important 
benefits and costs of education are left out of the conventional calculations. 
Furthermore, the benefits and costs that are considered are not evaluated 
properly when labor markets are not competitive. 
Looking ahead, the social rate of return approach can and should be 
refined. One refinement would be to include some of the things that are 
poverty, looking both on the beneficiary side and on the cost side of the 
ledger. Another refinement would be to devise a methodology for assessing margina 
social costs and benefits in the non-competitive labor market. The kinds. 
of questions that planners should ask economists to answer are: What kinds 
of jobs will the newly-educated workers get? How much more productive will 
they be in those jobs than less-educated workers? How many less-educated 
workers will be displaced? Where will they go and how productive will they 
be elsewhere, if in fact they are employed at all? These are not easy 
questions to answer empirically; a great deal of new information is needed to 
compute a marginal social rate of return to education. Unless planners 
have this information, how wise can their education decisions be? 
ATTENDIX 1. 
PLANNING EDUCATION'S CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIAL WELFARE: 
A FORMAL MODEL 
Assume an economy has a social welfare function W, the arguments of which 
are Gross National Product (Y), income inequality (I), absolute poverty (P), 
and education itself (ED), with partial derivatives as specified: 
(A.l) W = W(Y,I,F,ED), 
Wl > °> 
w2 < 0, 
W3 < °> 
W, > 0. 4 
Then when more persons in the economy are educated: 
^
 }
 dED 3Y 3ED 31 3ED 3P 3ED 3ED* 
This tells us that the effect of education on social welfare depends on a) the 
marginal contribution of each component to social welfare, and b) the change 
in each component as education increases. 
Standard educational planning approaches pay no attention to inequality, 
poverty, and education per se. They thus offer at best a partial accounting 
of the relevant social benefits and costs of education. But they do try to 
offer a reasonable estimate of the GNP effects of education. 
How successful are the standard methods at taking account of GNP effects? 
First, let us see what should be considered. Write gross output as Q and 
the aggregate production function as 
(A.3) Q - f(E1,EQ,K), f^ f2, f3 > 0, 
were E1 is employment of type-1 (educated) labor, E-. is employment of type-0 
(uneducated) labor, and K is the economy's capital stock. Education requires 
The time dimension must be such that future benefits are taken account 
the expenditure of resources to build and operate the schools; write the cost-
of-education function as: 
(A.4) C = C(ED), C* > 0. 
GNP net of educational costs is then 
(A.5) Y = f(E]L, E , K) - C(ED). 
If the economy is non-homogeneous and different, sectors (e.g., modern and 
traditional)co-exist, (A.5) becomes 
N • • -r • 
(A.6) Y = S [f^E1, Et, K1) - C(ED)], 
i-1 L U 
where there are N sectors, indexed by i. 
The effect of additional education on net GNP is found by totally 
differentiating Y with respect to ED: 
(A.7) _dY _ *! .Jff J5Ei\ 
dED " x=*l \_i 3ED ' 3E_ 
N -JL 3E 
i 
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This tells us that the output effects of education depend upon seven sets of 
factors, the first six of which have as many terms as there are sectors in 
the economy: 
i i 
1. The terms 3f /3E. , which tell if an additional educated 
worker is employed in sector i, how much he contributes 
to that sector's output. 
2. The terms 3E./3ED, which tell if more workers are educated, 
how many of them will be employed in sector i. 
i i 
3. The terms 3f /3En, which tell if an additional uneducated worker 
is employed in sector is how much he contributes to that sector's 
output. 
4. The terms 3E.-./3ED, which tell if more workers are educated, how 
many more or fewer uneducated workers will be employed in sector i. 
i -i -
5. The terms 3f /3K , which tell if additional capital is employed 
in sector i, how much it contributes to that sector's output. 
6. The terms 3K /3ED , which tell if more workers are educated, 
how much more or less capital will be employed in sector i. 
7. The term 3C/3ED, which is the social cost of education. 
Either factor markets are competitive or they are not. The reason this 
matters for educational planning is discussed in Section III and Appendix II. 
• In the case of competitive factor markets, we can readily find 6N + 1 
equations to go along with the 6N + 1 unknowns on the right hand side of (A.7). 
First of all, by virtue of competition, the marginal products of each factor 
are equalized across alternative uses. Thus, if each factor is used in 
each sector: 
(A.8.a) 3fX/3E* = 3fj/3E^ - W for all i, j; 
(A.8.b) SfVsE* » 3f^ /3Ej* » W for all i, j; 
(A.8.c) S^/SK1 » 3f^ /3KJ' - r for all i, j. 
(W. and Wn denote the wages of well-educated and less-educated labor respectivel 
Second,competition assures the full employment of all factors, and hence: 
N
 i (A.S.d) 2 3ET/3ED - 1, 
i»l 
N 
(A.8.e) Z 3EX/3ED • -1, 
i-1 
N
 i (A.8.f) I 3K /3ED - 0, 
i-1 
the latter assuming a fixed, fully-employed endowment of capital in the 
aggregate economy. Equations (A.8.-E), along with equation (A.4), provide 
the requisite 6N + 1 terms. By substitution, (A.7) becomes: 
^•'
;
 dED wi wo ' 
that is, the gain in net GNP is the wage of an educated worker, minus the wage 
of an uneducated worker, minus the cost of education exactly what is included 
in conventional social cost-benefit anaysis. 
When labor markets are not competitive, as indeed they are not in many 
developing economies, equations (A.8.a-f) do not hold. But equation (A.9) 
is derived from equations (A.8.a-f), so when they do not hold, equation (A.9) 
does not either. Thus, in the non-competitive case, there is no warrant for 
using the wage differential between educated and uneducated workers to approximate 
the social benefits of education. 
What should be used? What is needed is information on the seven sets 
of factors that enter into equation (A.7), It would be interesting to set up 
various models of labor markets, capital markets, and education and work through 
the necessary calculations. Appendix II presents one such model. Further 
research in building other models of interrelationships among education and 
factor markets would be worthwhile. 
APPENDIX II.-
SOCIAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND LA30R MARKET COMPETITIVENESS 
A. The Basic Issue 
Having examined the conventional procedures for computing social returns 
to education, we found that incomplete enumeration of social benefits may 
lead to an underestimate of the actual returns to education. My concern in this 
appendix is to show that when labor markets are not competitive, the usual way 
of evaluating social benefits leads to an overestimate of the economic returns, 
conceived of as the gains in output produced by a more educated labor force, 
To see why the accepted evaluation procedure may be unjustified and misleading 
in such a case, we must look carefully at the role of labor market competitiveness 
in validating established methods. 
Customarily, the benefits of education are found by comparing income profiles 
of persons with and without a particular level of education (for simplicity, 
termed "educated" and "uneducated" respectively). These profiles would typically 







This diagram depicts profiles for the average individual. Rates of return based 
on such profiles are therefore average rates. 
As always in economics, for policy purposes, the interest is in the marginal 
This appendix is drawn from Gary S. Fields, "Assessing Educational Progress 
and Commitment," Report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
October, 1978, revised version published under the title "Educational Progress 
nnH Fonnnm-fr npvel nnment" in Lascelles Anderson and Douelas Windham, eds.. 
expenditure, in this case, the marginal dollar spent on education or the marginal 
individual who receives that education. That is to say, the question for 
social decision-making in the education field is this: if society invests 
$X in more education, what is the extra benefit? The average return is a good 
guide if and only if it equals the marginal return. And as I shall now show, 
this holds only when labor markets are competitive. 
B. The Case of Competitive Labor Markets 
The conventional assumption maintained in the literature is that the 
marginal and average benefits from education are approximately equal, as 
are the marginal and average costs. On the cost side, this assumption poses 
little problem. On the benefit side, the assumption of equal marginal and 
average benefits is correct if the labor market works in the standard text-
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Educating an additional person shifts the supply of educated labor by one 
unit to the right and shifts the supply of uneducated labor by one unit to 
the left. The newly-educated worker is employed at the educated worker's 
wage (W , ) , which is only slightly different from the wage received pre-
ed 
viously by other educated workers. Likewise, the wage for uneducated workers 
changes slightly, but only by a small amount. Under the maintained assump-
tions of the textbook model—that the demand for labor reflects the marginal 
revenue product of labor and that the labor market is in full competitive 
equilibrium—the average wage differential between educated and uneducated 
workers then approximates the gain in social output due to the education of 
the marginal worker. Hence, when wages are determined competitively, the 
social rate of return to education as conventionally calculated provides a 
good estimate of the output gains from additional education. 
C. The Non-Comoetitive Case 
— —
 t l , t 
In many less developed countries, labor markets are not competitive. 
Often, these countries are characterized by a surplus of educated labor (surplus 
in the sense that more educated persons are available for work at the pre-
vailing wage than are demanded at that wage). Graphically, the situation 
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Unlike the competitive model where both employment and the wage are deter-
mined by supply and demand in the labor market, I think it is more realis-
tic to view the causal ordering as follows: 
(i) the wage is determined above the market-clearing level by some 
combination of institutional and market forces; 
(ii) firms determine employment in the textbook way by hiring until 
the marginal revenue product of labor equals the wage; 
and (iii), the supply of labor is a function of both the wage recieved 
while working and the volume of employment. 
Suppose now that one more person is educate^. If the labor surplus 
situation holds, the newly-educated individual enters the educated labor 
market (shift of the supoly curve from S , to S' ). But unlike the text-
ed ed 
book case, he will not be employed, since the wage does not fall to accomodate 
him. No new output is gained. The marginal social benefit in economic terms 
is zero. On the other hands, output is foregone (approximately MRP ,) and 
real resources are used to educate him. The marginal social return (marginal 
social benefits of education minus marginal social cost is negative, at least 
in familiar output terms. And, to repeat, it is the marginal social rate of 
return that is the proper criterion for assessing the economic value of 
educational investment. 
Marginal rates of return are seldom calculated. What is conventionally 
calculated is an average rate of return. This is likely to differ greatly 
from the marginal rate of return in the non-competitive case. In particular: 
Although the marginal social rate of return is expected to be 
negative in the non-competitive case, the average social rate 
of return as conventionally calculated is expected to be 
positive and very likely greater than the opportunity cost of funds. 
The reason the conventional rate of return is probably positive is that the. 
average social return about equals the expected private return. (They are 
not exactly equal because the private benefits are wages net of taxes and 
social benefits do not net out taxes, and because social costs exceed private 
costs by the amount of school subsidies.) And it may be presumed that the 
private rate of return is positive and at least equal to the opportunity 
cost of funds (because if it were not, parents would not be observed sending 
their children to school.) 
D« An Example 
A numerical example may help illustrate these points. Consider a 
simple case of two types of labor (skilled and unskilled) and two occu-
pations: clerks (the skilled occupation) and gardeners (the unskilled 
occupation). Wages for the two occupations are set according to the job 
and are taken as given. Assume that education is required for a job as a 
clerk and is preferred for a job as a gardener. This means that in a labor 
surplus situation, the educated workers compete amongst one another for jobs 
as clerks, but any educated person who seeks a job as a gardener is hired 
preferentially at the gardeners' wage. 
Suppose the state of the economy is: 
Wage of clerks (dollars per day) $20 
Employment of clerks 50 
Supply of clerks 100 
Wage of gardeners (dollars per day) $10 
Total employment of gardeners 40 
Supply of educated gardeners 25 
Employment of uneducated gardeners 15 
Supply of uneducated gardeners 75 
The question is whether additional investment in education is profitable. 
It would appear from these data that the answer is yes. After all, educated 
workers employed as clerks receive twice the wage of uneducated workers 
employed as gardeners, and educated workers have three times the probability 
of being employed at all. It might be presumed, therefore, that educational 
investment is worthwhile for society. But still, we should carry through 
the appropriate calculations. 
To compute private and social rates of return to education, (ignoring 
still who receives the benefits and who pays the costs) we need three ad-
ditional pieces of information: a projection of future labor market 
conditions, a measure of the educated-uneducated productivity differential, 
and knowledge of the costs of education. 
Concerning the future state of the labor market, let us make the simplest 
possible assumption: that current labor demand conditions (i.e., number of 
workers demanded in each occupation and the wage paid in each) will remain 
the same forever. This implies: 
(i) The current expected income differential between 
educated and uneducated workers ($8 per day = 
$2,000 per work year) is expected to prevail 
throughout the individual's working life. 
On the cost side, let us assume: 
(ii) It takes one period to educate a person; and 
(iii) The private cost of being educated (out-of-pocket 
cost plus foregone earnings) is $1,000. 
Equating the present value of private benefits with the present value 
of private costs, the private rate of return is given implicitly by 
2,000( T~- + -7TT-T 2 + • • • + 7TTT T) m 1.000, 1+r (1+r) (1+r) 
where T is the relevant time horizon, presumably retirement. For sufficiently 
large T, the left hand side is approximately 2,000/r. We then find that the 
private rate of return to educational investment is 200 percent. It would be 
an understatement to say that education would be a very lucrative personal 
investment. 
Consider now the social rate of return as *conventionally computed, i.e., 
the average rate. To compute the conventional social rate of return, we also 
need data on the social cost of education. To reflect the realistic condition 
that education in LDCs is typically highly-subsidized, assume: 
(iv) The social cost of educating one person is $10,000. 
The conventional social rate of return is given implicitly by 
2
-
000 (lfe + uW 2 + • • • + a^TT) _ 10-000 
and is found to be 20 percent. By the customary calculations, educational 
investment would appear desirable, provided the return on other alternative 
investments were lower, say 10 percent. Some might even say that this 
hypothetical country is not fully committed to education, since it is fore-
going a seemingly advantageous social investment. 
The problem with the inferences of the previous paragraph is that they 
are based on average rather than marginal calculations. The marginal social 
rate of return may be large, small, zero, or negative, depending on the size 
of the productivity gains resulting from education. Nothing in the data we 
have so far tells us which is the case (unless, that is, we make the assumption 
that an additional newly-educated individual would be employed at the skilled 
wage; this assumption is inconsistent with non-competitive wage setting in 
the labor surplus model under investigation). 
To compute we need some assumption about the productivity of educated 
workers relative to uneducated ones in the unskilled occupation, since that 
is where the newly-educated individual will be employed. Suppose in our 
example: 
(v) An educated gardener is 2 percent more productive than an 
uneducated one. 
The marginal social benefit is 2 percent of the gardener's wage, 2% x §10/day 
x 250 days/yr. = $50/yr. The marginal social rate of return is given implicitly 
by 
5 0 (1^ + life) 2 + . . . + -p^yT) . 10,000 
the solution of which yields a marginal social rate of return of one-half 
2 
of one percent. Despite the earlier findings that the average private and 
The reason he will be employed in the unskilled occupation is to main-
tain supply side equilibriura. The educated workers' labor market is in sunolv 
side equilibrium only when the expected wages (by definition, the wage while 
employed multiplied by the probability of employment) are equal in the two 
alternative occupations. Indeed they are equal in the hypothetical data in 
this example. If a newly-educated worker enters the skilled occupation (clerk), 
his presence there would depress the expected wage for clerks below the expectet 
wage for educated gardeners; he (or someone like him) could gain by taking up 
employEent as a gardener. 
2 
It is mathematically impossible for the internal rate of return to be 
social rates of return are very high (200 percent and 20 percent respectively), 
we would probably all agree from this final calculation that educational invest-
ment would be undesirable, at least in a strict economic sense. 
E. Conclusion 
Whenever social rates of return to education are computed by conventional 
methods, the competiveness of the labor market should be verified. For if labor 
markets are not competitive, the usual types of estimates of social rates of 
return to education may be unreliable and possibly grossly misleading. 
At least one real world study supports this theoretical skepticsim. I 
am familiar with only one empirical cost-benefit study of education which 
calculates a marginal social rate of return in a theoretically appropriate 
way. In a study of Greece, Psacharopoulos constructed a linear programming 
model with different skill grades of labor and estimated the shadow wage rates 
for each. For our purposes, the most interesting conclusion is: "In the 
case of Greece, investment priorities with respect to investment in skills 
estimated on the basis of observed labour earnings would have suggested a 
change in the wrong direction of the educational output." (Emphasis added.) 
Lest the critique of this appendix be misinterpreted, let me reiterate: 
the logic of social cost-benefit analysis in education is sound. Social cost-
benefit analysis asks the right questions. It must do a better job of 
answering them. 
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